The authors discuss the feasibility of a land-based East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC) connecting Afghanistan, India, Iran, Pakistan, and the Central Asian republics by exploring whether regional and global changes could facilitate an EWEC. The authors analyze results from a questionnaire they sent to policy experts from India and Pakistan. The authors then present recommendations for creating a successful EWEC.

Examining the Feasibility of an East-West Economic Corridor for South and Central Asia

Views from India and Pakistan

Rafiq Dossani, Arjun Kumar, Zohan Hasan Tariq, Raashid Wali Janjua, Simi Mehta, Khalid Hussain Chandio, Khurram Abbas, Amna Ejaz Rafi, Waleed Yawar

ResearchPublished Feb 20, 2025

In this exploratory report, the authors ask whether an East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC) linking Afghanistan, the Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), India, Iran, and Pakistan is feasible. Earlier efforts to develop economic corridors in this region have failed. The causes, the authors find, do not lie in doubts about the corridors' economic viability. Instead, the causes appear to be geopolitical alignments, internal conflicts, relations between EWEC members, great-power relations of EWEC members, and barriers to external capital. 

The authors reviewed literature about past corridor initiatives and developed a case study of regional pipeline initiatives to identify the causes of past successes and failures. The authors also explored the salience of these and possibly new causes through in-person interviews with policymakers and policy analysts in India and Pakistan. 

Key Findings

  • The criteria for a successful regional transport corridor appear to be less about the economic issues than about managing geopolitical pressure, great-power relations, lack of trust between member countries, terrorism, civil instability, and capital access constraints. India, given its emerging global-power status, could play a key role in addressing these noneconomic challenges.
  • Respondents from India and Pakistan chose the same most-preferred member countries, partner institutions, and associations for a potential EWEC.
  • The conventional benefits of great-power involvement—access to technology, systems, and capital—were considered to be less important than neutralizing great powers' influence over the project.
  • To address the challenges, respondents gave most weight to the establishment of a regional association with wide powers over the region's internal and external relations.
  • Respondents from both countries noted that a governance structure that gives each EWEC member one vote and favors building consensus would be appropriate, given the history of conflict within the region.
  • The literature review identified gaps in India's current capabilities to lead the implementation of an EWEC: limited provision of regional public goods and regional aid, low involvement in intraregional trade, and a near-complete absence of regional supply chains.
  • The strategic enablers discussed in the literature, apart from India's role—the Central Asian republics' globalization, Pakistan’s need for foreign direct investment, and Afghanistan's return to stability—were recognized by respondents and could help an EWEC succeed.

Recommendations

  • If an EWEC is to succeed, its starting point should prioritize political sensitivity in determining the sequencing of its construction.
  • Small confidence-building projects would be of particular use. Even something as small as a research-based association of EWEC partner countries—which would advocate regionally and globally for an EWEC as a critical vehicle for the region's sustainable development—would be useful.
  • Over the long term, the EWEC association (EWECA) would be vested with wide powers over the region's internal and external relations to address the challenges of forming an EWEC.
  • In the short term, the focus of an EWECA should be trust- and consensus-building. Its task should be to maintain equity in decisionmaking.
  • Given the state of distrust between key pairs of countries, the EWECA must start small. Only the governance structure should be specified initially.
  • An equitable governance structure in which consensus is encouraged is recommended. Each member would have a single vote without veto power to be used when consensus is not reached.
  • After trust is gained, the EWECA could build relations with great powers and initiate action plans for specific projects. These should be small, uncontroversial projects, such as improving the quality of existing digital links between countries.

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RAND Style Manual

Dossani, Rafiq, Arjun Kumar, Zohan Hasan Tariq, Raashid Wali Janjua, Simi Mehta, Khalid Hussain Chandio, Khurram Abbas, Amna Ejaz Rafi, and Waleed Yawar, Examining the Feasibility of an East-West Economic Corridor for South and Central Asia: Views from India and Pakistan, RAND Corporation, RR-A3076-1, 2025. As of April 8, 2025: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3076-1.html

Chicago Manual of Style

Dossani, Rafiq, Arjun Kumar, Zohan Hasan Tariq, Raashid Wali Janjua, Simi Mehta, Khalid Hussain Chandio, Khurram Abbas, Amna Ejaz Rafi, and Waleed Yawar, Examining the Feasibility of an East-West Economic Corridor for South and Central Asia: Views from India and Pakistan. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3076-1.html.
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This research was supported by the Junaid Family Foundation and the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy Advisory Board and conducted by RAND International.

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