There is no formal procedure on how to manage the array of risks that can afflict U.S. Army supply chains. As a result, the Army has a limited ability to proactively identify and manage supply chain risk across a weapon system program's life cycle. In this report, the authors develop frameworks to support implementation of an Army common operating procedure for identifying and managing supply chain risks during the weapon system's life cycle.

Frameworks for a Common Operating Procedure for Supply Chain Risk Management Over the Acquisition Life Cycle

Elvira N. Loredo, Jeremy M. Eckhause, Andrea M. Abler, Sean Colbert-Kelly, Aisha Najera, Karlyn D. Stanley, Anita Szafran, N. Peter Whitehead

ResearchPublished Dec 5, 2024

Although policy guidance is in place to manage some risks, there is no comprehensive procedure on how to manage the array of risks that can afflict U.S. Army supply chains. Because the Army lacks a comprehensive supply chain risk management (SCRM) system, there is limited ability to proactively identify and manage supply chain risks across a weapon system program's life cycle. In this report, the authors develop frameworks to support implementation of an Army common operating procedure for identifying and managing supply chain risks during the acquisition life cycle.

The authors surveyed the SCRM literature to catalog and define 10 supply chain risk categories and 31 supply chain risk drivers. They also documented lessons learned from three supply chain risk case studies. The authors reviewed the process steps and documents reflected in the Army acquisition life cycle; interviewed representatives from the acquisition and sustainment communities to understand the existing approach to SCRM; and then identified the steps along the process where supply chain risk activities might take place.

The authors recommend the adoption of three interconnected SCRM frameworks that span the weapon system's life cycle. By managing across three frameworks, the Army can focus SCRM activities within the organizations that have the most knowledge and information about the weapon system at that point in the life cycle. The interrelated nature of the frameworks promotes sharing knowledge and acknowledging the changing nature of risks across the life cycle.

Key Findings

The Army does not have an organizational structure dedicated to SCRM

  • The Army has a limited ability to proactively identify and manage supply chain risk across a weapon system program's life cycle.
  • The complexity of the Army's supply chain management is magnified because the Army is not in direct control of all the design decisions and production processes that support the production of their weapons systems.
  • Army risk management initiatives are mostly reactive in nature; the Army is often mitigating the effects of risks that have materialized rather than reducing the risk or the vulnerability of the weapon system to that risk.
  • The reactive nature of risk management is due in part to a lack of a comprehensive SCRM system.

Supply chain risks and vulnerabilities vary over time and depend on circumstances

  • The risks to a weapon system's supply chain is not static and will evolve across the entire acquisition life cycle.
  • Decisions in one phase of the life cycle might have supply chain risk implications in later phases.

SCRM issues can be cataloged into different risk categories and associated risk drivers

  • The academic and business literature on supply chain management consistently identifies a variety of risks that have befallen the global supply chains and severely affected the operations of leading firms.
  • The supply chain risk categories developed from the literature can be used as a guide and a starting point for populating the proposed SCRM-related sections within the existing Army life-cycle documents and processes.

Recommendations

  • The Army should adopt an SCRM process that (1) leverages the existing Department of Defense acquisitions life-cycle process; (2) broadens the scope of supply chain risks considered; and (3) develops policies and practices that support an SCRM strategy.
  • The process would consist of three frameworks, with transitions between frameworks taking place at two naturally occurring points in the life cycle.
  • For each framework, the Army should assign primary SCRM responsibility to the organization with primary responsibility for acquisition during that phase.
  • The Army should consider assessing risks across the following risk categories: climate and environmental; corporate and finance; supplier; cybersecurity; intellectual property and data rights; demand; geopolitical; people and skills; strategic materials; and transportation and inventory.
  • The Army should evaluate each weapon system for its potential supply chain risks by considering relevant categories and definitions.
  • Once the relevant categories are determined for that system, those evaluations can then be performed throughout the life cycle by the key Army stakeholders, with supporting input from original equipment manufacturers and relevant vendors.
  • If the adoption of these frameworks and their associated roles and responsibilities goes forward, mapping out a timeline for implementation must be established.

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Document Details

  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 2024
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 120
  • Paperback Price: $38.00
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 1-9774-1451-6
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA2002-1
  • Document Number: RR-A2002-1

Citation

RAND Style Manual

Loredo, Elvira N., Jeremy M. Eckhause, Andrea M. Abler, Sean Colbert-Kelly, Aisha Najera, Karlyn D. Stanley, Anita Szafran, and N. Peter Whitehead, Frameworks for a Common Operating Procedure for Supply Chain Risk Management Over the Acquisition Life Cycle, RAND Corporation, RR-A2002-1, 2024. As of April 8, 2025: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2002-1.html

Chicago Manual of Style

Loredo, Elvira N., Jeremy M. Eckhause, Andrea M. Abler, Sean Colbert-Kelly, Aisha Najera, Karlyn D. Stanley, Anita Szafran, and N. Peter Whitehead, Frameworks for a Common Operating Procedure for Supply Chain Risk Management Over the Acquisition Life Cycle. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2024. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2002-1.html. Also available in print form.
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This research was prepared for the United States Army and conducted within the Forces and Logistics Program of RAND Arroyo Center.

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