There is a tendency in international relations to focus on great powers: the British Empire, the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China. One country that rarely is treated as a serious geostrategic actor is Japan.
But during the first Donald Trump administration, as the United States took a more forceful position vis-à-vis China, it also pulled back from a leadership role in other parts of East Asia. At the time, Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (PDF) filled the gap by being a more proactive and constructive player on the world stage. Should Trump's second administration take a similar approach, there is no guarantee Japan will fulfill a leadership role this time, due to its own political instability. Should Japan and the United States' abdication of leadership come to pass, it would cede critical geopolitical space to China, North Korea, and Russia.
When Trump first became president in 2016, he engaged with the Indo-Pacific region, but he was not focused on leading. For starters, instead of crafting a regional strategy that showcased American leadership, the Trump administration adopted Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) (PDF) concept as the framework to blunt Chinese influence and presence. This led the administration to, among other things, impose broad-based tariffs against Chinese goods. While it launched new initiatives to expand U.S. public and private investment in regional infrastructure, energy markets, and the digital economy, Trump withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and imposed tariffs on several states, including close U.S. allies and partners.
In the security domain, instead of innovating ways to lead regional allies and partners to work together to preserve regional openness and stability, and to counter shared adversaries, Trump actively criticized treaty allies like Japan and South Korea, and pushed them to bear an increase in the costs for stationing American troops in exchange for continued U.S. protection.
Should Japan and the United States' abdication of leadership come to pass, it would cede critical geopolitical space to China, North Korea, and Russia.
Importantly, there was little effort to encourage good governance, democracy, and shared principles. Instead, he often praised authoritarian leaders like Kim Jong-un, and tended to avoid calling out human rights abuses.
The collective result was an absence of U.S. leadership on critical issues facing the region. But not so with Japan.
Abe's Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy provided nations with a plan for maintaining regional peace and prosperity against a variety of threats to the rule of law and governance. In addition to strategic use of development assistance, Japan strengthened security cooperation with like-minded countries, both bilaterally and in strategic groupings. Abe's successful advocacy to reestablish the Quad—under which the United States, Japan, Australia, and India could work together in ad hoc ways—was one of the centerpieces of this. And to leverage its regional engagement and promote alignment among regional states to mitigate Chinese influence, Japan pushed for strategic partnerships, the number of which today sits at about 40.
Similarly, when Trump withdrew from the TPP, it was Abe who stepped in and led the successor Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Not only did Japan advocate for free trade, as well as norms and principles to guide regional behavior, it also never gave up on the United States, consistently urging it to join.
Additionally, in the absence of U.S. advocacy for democracy, Japan's development assistance—which promotes democracy and the rule of law as alternatives to China's condition-based, debt-trap diplomacy—has increased by $5.4 million since 2018, to $19.6 million in 2023.
Collectively, Japan buttressed the international order at a time when China threatened it and America's leadership waned. Credit goes squarely to Abe, who persisted in his efforts even when the United States did not appear interested. Leadership, in other words, matters. But that historical precedent may not repeat itself.
It is still too early to know what Trump will do in his second term. Some have argued that the essence of Trump's foreign policy approach—transactionalism—remains unchanged. Examples to support that include statements he has made on Taiwan and NATO. While Trump's supporters will argue that this approach makes America's friends more self-reliant, it may not be a recipe for U.S. leadership. Instead, best summarized by Hal Brands, it could be an administration “less concerned with defending global norms, providing public goods, and protecting distant allies…[with a foreign policy that is] less principled, more zero-sum.”
Problematically, the potential for Japan to step in again and demonstrate strong leadership is unlikely due to political instability.
Prime Minster Shigeru Ishiba called a snap election after becoming premier in October. The gamble did not pay off as his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and coalition partner Komeito lost their majority for the first time since 2009. Because the opposition Democratic Party for the People refused to enter a coalition with them, Ishiba is now overseeing a minority government. This crumbling political foundation means not only that Ishiba is weakened, but that the LDP and Komeito cannot push their policies through at will. Instead, they will have to negotiate everything with opposition parties.
Moreover, with opposition parties likely to push Ishiba for sweeping political reforms and coalition members demanding economic policies to appease voters, foreign policy is unlikely to be his priority. This results in a very different Japan. Ishiba does not have the flexibility or the political capital to think creatively about potential ways Japan can exercise leadership in the region.
The danger of a potential leadership vacuum in the Indo-Pacific sends a message of Western weakness that Beijing, Pyongyang, or Moscow may seek to leverage. After all, not only have China and Russia forged a “no-limits strategic partnership,” complete with Beijing's support of Moscow's aggression against Ukraine, North Korea has also made a similar agreement with Moscow. What is more, North Korea has sent soldiers to Russia's Kursk region to assist Russia in carrying out an assault on Ukrainian positions. This triumvirate of authoritarian states will thrive in an environment where Western leadership is lacking.
Ishiba does not have the flexibility or the political capital to think creatively about potential ways Japan can exercise leadership in the region.
The result, where might makes right, could go unchecked. The consequence would be that the liberal international order would suffer, as stronger authoritarian leaders would experience little opposition to confronting weaker neighbors. As Kori Schake reminds us, China may be the country that steps in to enforce its vision of an international order. The end state is instability in the short term, and empowered autocrats in the long term.
Leadership is responsibility, but there is no certainty that the Indo-Pacific's two biggest stalwart protectors of the international order will take up the leadership mantel. Japan has shown its ability to lead in peacetime. Similarly, there is no combination of states that can blunt Chinese power in a crisis that does not include the United States. Both are consequential, making their absence in leadership sorely missed should that come to pass.
