Developing Combat Support Mission Ready Airmen for Agile Combat Employment

Maria C. Lytell, Mark Toukan, Angela K. Clague, James Fan, Vikram Kilambi, Brandon Krueger, Sankalp Kumar, Anthony Lawrence, Nicolas M. Robles, Lewis Schneider, et al.

ResearchPublished Apr 18, 2025

As the U.S. Air Force (USAF) changes how it generates and presents forces in a potential conflict with a peer competitor, it will need a way to develop mission ready airmen (MRA) with a mix of skills and experiences to successfully operate across different types of missions, including those involving dispersed operations under agile combat employment. The path to developing MRA is not straightforward, especially for airmen in combat support (CS) communities, such as maintenance, logistics, engineering, and force protection. CS airmen are not traditionally organized, trained, and used to operate as MRA. Instead, CS MRA will be developed under the Air Force Force Generation Model (AFFORGEN), the USAF’s new force generation construct. To address concerns about developing CS MRA, RAND researchers evaluated the process of organizing, training, and utilizing CS MRA for agile combat employment.

RAND researchers reviewed USAF policy and spoke with USAF policy experts to understand USAF’s latest plans involving AFFORGEN and force presentation models. They interviewed USAF unit leaders and experts about perceived impediments to developing CS airmen as MRA under AFFORGEN and air task forces (ATFs), which USAF was developing at the time of RAND’s analysis. These interviews were followed by a multiday workshop with other USAF leaders and experts—primarily from the CS community—to address these perceived impediments. Finally, they developed and ran simulation models that assigned CS airmen to ATFs and evaluated training proficiency and costs associated with CS airmen development under AFFORGEN.

Key Findings

  • There is confusion about the operational relationship between mission sustainment teams (MSTs) and mission generation force elements (MGFEs).
  • Although ATFs can be filled overall, notwithstanding overlaps among command elements, key specialties will be difficult to fill.
  • Sourcing CS airmen from the same bases will likely continue to be a challenge for ATFs and combat wings.
  • Without training and proficiency standards, wings might not prioritize CS airmen development into MRA.
  • Even if wings prioritize CS MRA training, the lack of standards for cross-utilization training could result in different levels or types of CS MRA.
  • Back-loaded training schedules produced the highest average proficiency throughout the Available phase, but simulated proficiency varies widely across Air Force Specialty Codes in ATFs.
  • USAF lacks defined risk levels associated with attrition of CS airmen from force elements in ATFs.
  • MRA definitions might not be clear to personnel at the wing level and below.
  • USAF lacks a systematic way to track CS MRA across the enterprise.

Recommendations

  • USAF should clarify the relationship between MSTs and MGFEs.
  • USAF should relax assignment requirements based on Air Force Specialty Code and location and employ different career field management approaches to fill ATFs or combat wings.
  • To meet the needs for new air base wings, USAF should consider civilianization of base functions and rebasing options that can address persistent CS manning challenges.
  • USAF should establish a program to set cross-utilization training standards for CS capabilities aligned to ATFs and combat wings.
  • USAF should establish a qualification program to certify CS MRA.
  • To inform training proficiency targets for CS MRA in combat wings, USAF should assign proficiency targets for training events in ATF training plan(s) and then compare different training schedules.
  • USAF should continue to exercise CS capabilities to test resilience of force elements such as MSTs and MGFEs.
  • USAF should develop and communicate more-detailed definitions of MRA.
  • USAF should establish a way to track CS MRA in the personnel system.

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Document Details

  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 2025
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 101
  • Paperback Price: $49.00
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 1-9774-1504-0
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA3169-1
  • Document Number: RR-A3169-1

Citation

RAND Style Manual

Lytell, Maria C., Mark Toukan, Angela K. Clague, James Fan, Vikram Kilambi, Brandon Krueger, Sankalp Kumar, Anthony Lawrence, Nicolas M. Robles, Lewis Schneider, Karen M. Sudkamp, Sarah Weilant, and Katie A. Wilson, Developing Combat Support Mission Ready Airmen for Agile Combat Employment, RAND Corporation, RR-A3169-1, 2025. As of April 21, 2025: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3169-1.html

Chicago Manual of Style

Lytell, Maria C., Mark Toukan, Angela K. Clague, James Fan, Vikram Kilambi, Brandon Krueger, Sankalp Kumar, Anthony Lawrence, Nicolas M. Robles, Lewis Schneider, Karen M. Sudkamp, Sarah Weilant, and Katie A. Wilson, Developing Combat Support Mission Ready Airmen for Agile Combat Employment. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3169-1.html. Also available in print form.
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This research was commissioned by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, Headquarters USAF (AF/A4), and conducted within the Workforce, Development, and Health Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE.

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