This report provides an analysis of existing end-use monitoring (EUM) programs and policy, and the authors envision the requirements of an expanded EUM scope that includes monitoring end users' operational use of U.S.-origin defense articles and services.

Expanding the Scope of End-Use Monitoring Policies to Address Operational Use of U.S.-Origin Weapons

Aidan Winn, Alisa Laufer, Omar Danaf

ResearchPublished Jan 30, 2025

The U.S. government is required to conduct end-use monitoring (EUM) to ensure that foreign end users of U.S. defense articles and services are complying with the requirements of government-to-government agreements with respect to use, transfers, and security. EUM is not currently structured or resourced to monitor partners' operational use of transferred articles. However, in light of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)–heightened commitments to mitigate civilian harm in U.S. military operations and efforts to integrate these principles into security cooperation programs, greater visibility into partner operational use of U.S.-supplied weapons is required to ensure partner compliance. The scope and purpose of EUM deserves to be revisited.

In this report, the authors analyze the scope of existing EUM programs and identify mechanisms to better align U.S. policies and programs with broader national security guidance and policy commitments to enshrine human rights and civilian harm mitigation considerations in arms-transfer decisions. The authors envision an expanded scope for EUM that includes monitoring end users' operational use of U.S.-origin weapons and propose possible avenues for implementing operational EUM that complement DoD's broader, ongoing efforts to mitigate the risk of civilian harm.

Key Findings

  • DoD terminology related to the Golden Sentry EUM program has created confusion.
  • DoD monitoring of foreign partners' operations will require new roles, the application of a broad variety of skills, and more resources.
  • Clear interagency standards will be important in implementing a broadened EUM policy.
  • Existing EUM policy designates weapons according to the risks associated with diversion, and a new risk paradigm is needed for operational EUM.

Recommendations

  • Establish new policy guidance that clarifies terminology and assigns responsibilities for DoD's monitoring of partners' employment of U.S.-origin defense articles.
  • Adopt a phased approach to resourcing an operational EUM program scope expansion.
  • Collaborate across the interagency to establish a centralized system for collecting public reports of harm by partners using U.S.-origin defense articles.
  • Define consistent standards for evidence in investigations to facilitate intake of civilian harm reports from external sources.
  • Establish an external advisory board for operational EUM investigations.
  • Develop a new designation system for weapon transfers according to their risks of causing civilian harm.
  • Consider weapon type, operational context, and partner's civilian harm mitigation will and capability when measuring risk.

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Document Details

  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 2025
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 110
  • Paperback Price: $22.00
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 1-9774-1474-5
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA2961-2
  • Document Number: RR-A2961-2

Citation

RAND Style Manual

Winn, Aidan, Alisa Laufer, and Omar Danaf, Expanding the Scope of End-Use Monitoring Policies to Address Operational Use of U.S.-Origin Weapons, RAND Corporation, RR-A2961-2, 2025. As of April 8, 2025: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2961-2.html

Chicago Manual of Style

Winn, Aidan, Alisa Laufer, and Omar Danaf, Expanding the Scope of End-Use Monitoring Policies to Address Operational Use of U.S.-Origin Weapons. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2961-2.html. Also available in print form.
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This research was sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Global Partnerships Office, and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).

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