In this report, the authors present an analysis of China's economic, scientific, and information activities in the Arctic and call special attention to the intelligence collection and military risks that they might present, including the threat signals for these risks and U.S. concerns that China might be on its way to becoming a security and military actor in the Arctic and that Russia is enabling this pathway.

China's Economic, Scientific, and Information Activities in the Arctic

Benign Activities or Hidden Agenda?

Stephanie Pezard, Irina A. Chindea, Naoko Aoki, Domenique Lumpkin, Yuliya Shokh

ResearchPublished Jan 23, 2025

How might China's scientific, information, and commercial activities in the Arctic contribute to the country's broader security goals by enabling the collection of intelligence, allowing access to critical infrastructure, or providing other types of military advantages? China's activities in the Arctic have increased, and China's overall approach to strategic competition, which fuses the public with the private and the civilian sphere with the military, has heightened U.S. concerns that China might be on its way to becoming a security and military actor in the Arctic and that Russia is enabling this pathway.

In this report, the authors present an analysis of China's economic, scientific, and information activities in the Arctic and call special attention to the intelligence collection and military risks that they might present, including the threat signals for these risks. The authors explore five categories of activities: natural resource exploitation, knowledge development, access to infrastructure, data transmission, and public diplomacy.

Key Findings

  • The risks of confrontation with China as a consequence of its economic, scientific, and information activities are rare, except for the following hypothetical two cases, neither of which pose immediate threats: (1) future presence of Chinese ocean-going ships that have engaged in aggressive behavior in other regions and (2) Chinese spoofing or deception of military global positioning system assets using the electromagnetic spectrum.
  • The risks of financial dependence and political leverage are limited among all states with interests in the Arctic except for Russia because of the sheer size of China's investments in the Russian Arctic.
  • Data and information transmission activities present the clearest risks, having the potential to allow for intelligence collection, military applications, or threats to critical infrastructure. Some access-related activities also present risks. However, most of these activities would present a risk to the United States and its Arctic allies only if they were to reverse some of their restrictive policies that limit Chinese inroads in these domains.
  • Chinese investments in and construction of infrastructure provide potential avenues for China to obtain intelligence on U.S. and allied military activities, depending on their location (e.g., if close to sensitive sites) and function.
  • Activities related to science and transmission of information and data could be other venues for intelligence collection.

Recommendations

  • Not all Chinese activities in the Arctic present the same level of risk and, accordingly, do not warrant the same level of scrutiny. Knowledge development and public and science diplomacy present (relatively) limited threats. Natural resource extraction mostly presents risks when undertaken on a large scale in a country or combined with control of infrastructure or means of transportation. Data and information transmission and, to a lesser extent, infrastructure and transportation are broad categories of activities with the most potential for military and intelligence threats.
  • Some of the threats identified could materialize more quickly than others. For instance, a sudden change in legislation could open the door to more Chinese data and information transmissions activities, whereas activities related to mining and fishing would take a long time to develop.
  • The evolution of China's overall efforts in the Arctic (e.g., mining, building infrastructure, scientific activities) can provide a sense of how important the Arctic is in China's overall national strategy.
  • Although China's aggressive behavior and instrumentalization of economic, scientific, and information activities in other regions cannot necessarily be extrapolated to the Arctic because of the region's unique characteristics, what China does closer to its territory could indicate the types of behaviors that can be expected when China feels that the stakes are high and that it has the capabilities to pursue more aggressive behaviors. Even though the Arctic does not fall in this category yet, the region could do so in the future.

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Pezard, Stephanie, Irina A. Chindea, Naoko Aoki, Domenique Lumpkin, and Yuliya Shokh, China's Economic, Scientific, and Information Activities in the Arctic: Benign Activities or Hidden Agenda? RAND Corporation, RR-A2823-1, 2025. As of April 8, 2025: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2823-1.html

Chicago Manual of Style

Pezard, Stephanie, Irina A. Chindea, Naoko Aoki, Domenique Lumpkin, and Yuliya Shokh, China's Economic, Scientific, and Information Activities in the Arctic: Benign Activities or Hidden Agenda? Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2823-1.html.
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