Exploring Factors for U.S.-Russia Crisis Stability in Space

Cheyenne Tretter

ResearchPublished Jan 21, 2025

Military competition in space between the United States and Russia has intensified. As a result, understanding Russia's perspectives on the space domain and identifying the key factors that threaten U.S.-Russia crisis stability in space have become increasingly important for devising and implementing crisis management strategies. In this report, the author seeks to better understand Russia's perspectives on space and crisis stability and explores the issue of escalation in space between the United States and Russia.

The report surveys open-source literature from across the Russian defense enterprise and other sources. The analysis is divided into three periods, 1960–2014, 2014–2022, and post–2022, which reflect two major Russian military junctures: Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The author examines, in part, whether and how Russian thinking and strategy in space changed with each event and the potential implications for U.S.-Russia crisis stability in space.

Key Findings

  • Russia's perspectives on space are influenced by its overarching perception of U.S. hostility and aggression. Some Russian analysts worry about U.S. threats to the space-based elements of Moscow's nuclear deterrent and speculate about U.S. plans to use space to conduct a disarming attack to deprive Russia of its retaliatory capability.
  • Russia's fears about U.S. incentives for early escalation in the space domain and perceptions of U.S. hostility heighten the potential for misperceptions of U.S. actions in space. Russia's emerging approach to escalation management—a cost-imposition strategy based on the belief that escalation can be controlled—might further reinforce perceived incentives to escalate early.
  • Russian doctrine and military thought show that deterrence is not limited to preventing the outbreak of conflict. Moscow's sanguine attitude about the preventability of inadvertent escalation could prove to be destabilizing in a crisis.
  • The United States should not assume that traditional methods of crisis management will be effective in a crisis with Russia in space. Attempts to use existing crisis communication lines or to create crisis guardrails might be met with Russia's suspicion.
  • Russia's invasion of Ukraine does not appear to have significantly affected Russia's risk tolerance or strategy in space. Even though Russia's behavior in space has been much more restrained than might be expected, Russia would likely behave differently in a conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
  • Russian strategists have begun to focus more on explicit planning for warfighting in space, which indicates that Russia's risk tolerance in space might increase.

Recommendations

  • U.S. officials responsible for managing U.S.-Russia crises in space should be prepared for contingencies in which meaningful cooperation or communication with Russia is absent. Officials will likely need to navigate a decision space that is fraught with uncertainty and inflated Russian threat perceptions that will complicate U.S. attempts to manage escalation risks.
  • U.S. officials should not assume that Russia's space activities during the conflict in Ukraine are indicative of a broader trend of Russia's risk aversion in space. Rather, post-2022 writings by Russian theorists suggest that risk tolerance has remained relatively consistent since 2014. There are emerging threads that suggest that Russia's risk tolerance in space might even be increasing because planning for warfighting in space has become more explicit. In a conflict between NATO and Russia, the United States should be prepared to face an adversary that not only possesses advanced space and counterspace capabilities but has also learned lessons during the invasion of Ukraine about how to target Western space assets most effectively.

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Document Details

  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 2025
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 42
  • Paperback Price: $23.00
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 1-9774-1347-1
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA2313-3
  • Document Number: RR-A2313-3

Citation

RAND Style Manual

Tretter, Cheyenne, Exploring Factors for U.S.-Russia Crisis Stability in Space, RAND Corporation, RR-A2313-3, 2025. As of April 30, 2025: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2313-3.html

Chicago Manual of Style

Tretter, Cheyenne, Exploring Factors for U.S.-Russia Crisis Stability in Space. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2313-3.html. Also available in print form.
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