For thinly defended allies, innovative concepts — using new technologies – could be the difference between winning and losing a war in that window between unambiguous warning and the arrival of reinforcements. Researchers propose innovative uses of fifth generation–ecosystem technologies that have the potential to offer novel or dramatically improved military capabilities.

Harnessing 5G-Era Innovations

Preparations Allies Could Make to Defend Against Attack

Timothy M. Bonds, Mary Lee, Nicholas A. O'Donoughue, Brandon F. De Bruhl, Sally Ayuk, Thomas Hamilton, Randall Steeb, Gary J. Briggs

ResearchPublished Feb 19, 2025

Potential adversaries have likely concluded that military victory requires them to achieve their objectives before the United States can surge reinforcements. For thinly defended allies, innovative concepts — using new technologies — could be the difference between winning and losing a war in that window between unambiguous warning and the arrival of reinforcements. Researchers propose innovative uses of fifth generation (5G)–ecosystem technologies that have the potential to offer novel or dramatically improved military capabilities. Specifically, researchers sought new concepts to solve complex operational problems — such as stopping an invasion by a numerically superior adversary.

Key Findings

  • The 5G ecosystem offers technologies that could support diverse operational concepts to defend allies.
  • Time difference of arrival (TDOA) techniques comprise a particularly prompt and effective way to locate and target air defense radars.
  • Each of the concepts evaluated in this report, with the exceptions of using smart roads or smart dust, are ready for field experiments at scale.
  • At the heart of each concept developed in this research is a small human team able to operate independently in austere conditions. The bulk of these teams should come from the nations in which they are deployed.

Recommendations

  • DoD should begin experimenting with cell tower–mounted TDOA.
  • In addition to TDOA nets, DoD should experiment with passing information among human, camera, and drone networks.
  • DoD should task the services and U.S. European Command to develop operational concepts for kill zones incorporating wireless edge nets.
  • Tactical edge nets should feed into operational networks that maintain a Russian electronic order of battle and maintain a theater-wide signals overwatch of Russian radars, electronic warfare assets, and other emitters.
  • DoD should task the services and U.S. Special Operations Command to organize, train, and equip prototype teams able to operate edge networks.

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Document Details

  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 2025
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 164
  • Paperback Price: $47.00
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 1-9774-1296-3
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA2125-1
  • Document Number: RR-A2125-1

Citation

RAND Style Manual

Bonds, Timothy M., Mary Lee, Nicholas A. O'Donoughue, Brandon F. De Bruhl, Sally Ayuk, Thomas Hamilton, Randall Steeb, and Gary J. Briggs, Harnessing 5G-Era Innovations: Preparations Allies Could Make to Defend Against Attack, RAND Corporation, RR-A2125-1, 2025. As of April 8, 2025: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2125-1.html

Chicago Manual of Style

Bonds, Timothy M., Mary Lee, Nicholas A. O'Donoughue, Brandon F. De Bruhl, Sally Ayuk, Thomas Hamilton, Randall Steeb, and Gary J. Briggs, Harnessing 5G-Era Innovations: Preparations Allies Could Make to Defend Against Attack. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2125-1.html. Also available in print form.
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This research was sponsored by the Operate Through Program Lead of the 5G-to-NextG initiative at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).

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