Russian Military Wartime Personnel Recruiting and Retention 2022–2023

Dara Massicot

ResearchPublished Jul 16, 2024

In this report, the author presents an evaluation of the effects of Russia's full-scale 2022 invasion of Ukraine on Russian military manpower and the potential future effects on recruiting and retention. The analysis has identified several efforts that Russia's government is pursuing to stabilize wartime recruiting and retention and to mitigate emerging problems when the war ends. However, the heavy casualties, poor force employment, and flawed unit leadership that the soldiers are experiencing will undermine these efforts. This report presents a survey of the severe losses of Russian manpower during the first 18 months in Ukraine, an evaluation of Moscow's wartime recruiting and retention strategies during this period, and the near-term implications for Russia's military manpower moving forward.

This report seeks to fill a gap in analysis on what the future could hold for the Russian government's ability to recruit and retain a professional military force. Prior to its invasion of Ukraine, the Russian military spent nearly 20 years trying to recruit, train, and retain a more proficient and more professional military. Yet images and stories from occupied Ukraine paint a bleak picture of indifference and cruelty to Russian military personnel by their own command while at war. The effect of these casualties and the combat trauma for those who survive will have acute and lasting effects on the Russian military's culture and ability to recruit and retain service personnel for years to come.

Key Findings

  • Russia's military has sustained more casualties in 18 months of war in Ukraine than in an entire decade in Afghanistan or during two campaigns in Chechnya. The impact of these casualties and the combat trauma for those who survive will have acute and lasting effects on the Russian military's ability to recruit and retain service personnel for many years.
  • Severe casualties and a brutal command style are threatening to undo nearly 20 years of effort to create a more professional force.
  • Russia took extraordinary measures to stabilize manpower levels, such as lowering recruiting standards; expanding financial and social benefits; and using mercenaries, convicts, and mobilization to fill its ranks. Russia will likely need to continue some of these policies to recruit and retain personnel after the war ends.
  • Recruiting after the war concludes could be less affected as memories fade and if Russian authorities can maintain competitive material benefits. Much will depend on how the conflict ends and whether that resolution is viewed as successful.
  • The impact on future retention is largely unknown because no military personnel can voluntarily leave military service until the government declares an end to the war. Many pillars of pre-war retention, such as discipline, good order, and perceptions of prestige, have been undermined.
  • The Russian government is shaping domestic impressions of the war and of military performance. The government is using intangible factors to increase feelings of patriotism and duty and is progressively framing the war in Ukraine as an existential conflict against the West.

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Document Details

  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 2024
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 116
  • Paperback Price: $23.00
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 1-9774-1327-7
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA2061-4
  • Document Number: RR-A2061-4

Citation

RAND Style Manual

Massicot, Dara, Russian Military Wartime Personnel Recruiting and Retention 2022–2023, RAND Corporation, RR-A2061-4, 2024. As of April 8, 2025: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2061-4.html

Chicago Manual of Style

Massicot, Dara, Russian Military Wartime Personnel Recruiting and Retention 2022–2023. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2024. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2061-4.html. Also available in print form.
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This research was sponsored by U.S. European Command's Russia Strategic Initiative and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).

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