Hate and Dehumanization in Russia's Narrative on Ukraine

Russia's invasion of Ukraine was an act of naked aggression. To spin its unjust war, Russia cloaked itself in a robe of propaganda and disinformation. Russia’s narratives include claims that Ukraine has been overrun by Nazis and needs to be "denazified," a justification presented by Russian President Vladmir Putin on the day of the invasion. Russia's narratives include the use of ethnic slurs and other dehumanizing language that seeks to justify and promote violence against Ukrainians. But how successful have these narratives been in mainstreaming their messages and reaching broad audiences?

A recent RAND study examined the spread of racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE) narratives to shed light on how Russia's hate-peddling narratives deployed in the war have spread online through social media. Using tools of network and content analysis on a multilingual body of data from X and Telegram, researchers analyzed Russia's propagandists' and proxies' success in reaching broad audiences through social media; sought to understand who is shaping, spreading, and amplifying REMVE narratives; and examined whether these narratives are fueling REMVE sentiment in ways that might raise the risk of actual violence.

Understanding these issues can help the U.S. Department of State and its counterparts understand the effects of Russia’s REMVE narratives and inform policymaker responses.

Identifying REMVE Content in Pro-Russian Narratives

To identify narratives originating in Russia that advance REMVE-infused ideas in the context of the war in Ukraine, researchers reviewed Russian state officials' statements, major Russian state-sponsored media, and relevant nonstate voices on social media outlets. From these sources, they identified four themes prevalent in REMVE rhetoric, which are summarized in Table 1.

Researchers used keywords related to these narratives, translated into major European languages, to identify posts echoing these themes on X and Telegram. The data pull for all the narratives produced a substantial body of posts—more than 43 million, by about 3.8 million unique authors—in more than 30 languages, across the two platforms. The number of posts pertaining to these narratives rose dramatically with Russia's invasion, as expected. On X, for example, shown in Figure 1, the number of posts—which could be pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian—rose from levels close to zero to more than 300,000 daily posts in the initial days of the war. It dropped dramatically in the months after the invasion, but saw smaller surges along with some major war-related events.

Colored areas in the chart represent eight languages (English, Russian, Spanish, Ukrainian, French, Italian, German, Polish, and other), with English having the largest share of posts throughout the timespan.

The biggest spike on the chart is when Russia invades Ukraine at the end of February 2022. Other spikes are during the following events: Bucha massacre evidence; Victory Day in Russia; Russia attacks power grid; Zelenskyy visits U.S.; Victory Day in Russia; Russian explodes dam; Wagner mutiny; and the Hamas attack in October 2023.

Key Findings from Network and Content Analyses

Researchers used interactions between authors (on X) or channels (on Telegram) to map and analyze networks formed around discussions of these four narratives. These analyses shed light on (1) who the audiences are for this discourse, (2) which actors are central to the spread and amplification of the content, and (3) what topics are discussed.

Who Are the Audiences for Russia's REMVE Narratives?

The networks formed around Russia's REMVE-filled narratives on both platforms are quite multilingual. As expected, these networks are made up of large Russian-language audiences—which are not confined to Russia but also present in many European countries. On X, the largest audiences that interact within REMVE networks spoke English, which was the second-largest language on Telegram after Russian. REMVE-filled discussions also drew large Spanish-speaking audiences on X, which likely reflects Russia's successes in building up information networks in Spain and Latin America. Other major European linguistic communities, including German, French, and Italian, were also represented across the two platforms.

Researchers found some audiences centered in Eastern Europe that, while small, may be of greater concern. Serbian- and Bulgarian-language communities emerged as particularly vulnerable to REMVE messages on both X and Telegram. These communities more readily import REMVE content from English and Russian than others, and their content is more saturated with REMVE language. And these communities host some of the most-virulent non-Russian-language channels on Telegram—that is, those that make the most abundant use of ethnic slurs. Finally, researchers also examined the content posted by 86 existing European REMVE groups with Telegram channels: Here too, Serbian and Bulgarian extremist organizations used REMVE language in the context of Ukraine more often than groups from other linguistic communities.

Who Is Shaping, Spreading, and Amplifying REMVE Narratives?

On X, the most popular sources of content are a mix of media sources, propagandists, and other prominent figures, such as social-media influencers, with many posting in English. On Telegram, a mixture of pro-Russian news organizations, prominent propagandists, and military bloggers occupy a central place. The nationalist and pro-Russian voices of these military bloggers interweave REMVE rhetoric in the course of reporting on the war, which can introduce casual usage of anti-Ukrainian REMVE tropes to more-mainstream audiences. Whereas content that receives the most attention from the networks comes from prominent, easily recognizable accounts, the actors who most actively sought to engage the network on X and spread content were predominantly nonrecognizable and often anonymous.

Many Russian state actors and state-affiliated actors are part of the networks spreading REMVE narratives on the two platforms. Their influence in the networks, however, is highly variable: Most state voices are not very central in the networks, while some state-affiliated media figures are more so. However, tracing the full scope of the Russian state’s role on social media is difficult. Many of the actors who are more central to the discourse may simply believe in the ideas or may be motivated by popularity. But influential and active actors on both platforms may well include proxies for the state or state affiliates, or even state organs operating covertly.

What Topics Are Being Discussed Within the Networks?

The researchers conducted analyses of the content of discussions within the networks on the two platforms. On Telegram, Russian-language content was overwhelmingly focused on the war. In some contrast, English-language content included discussions of Russia's war on Ukraine but also more prominently encompassed other topics, such as U.S.-centric alt-right and conspiracy content and the Israel-Hamas war. These features of Russian-language REMVE discourse also suggest the possibility that, if and as the kinetic aspects of the conflict subside, interest in the content spread by war-focused channels may also subside, decreasing their popularity and reach.

On X, researchers examined the context of the spread of ethnic slurs in the network. Slurs and similarly dehumanizing language are particularly concerning because there is a demonstrated relationship between dehumanizing individuals and the risk of violence against them. And relatively few European societies have significant preexisting animus toward Ukrainians as a distinct ethno-national group. Thus, the spread of ethnic slurs is a decent indicator for whether pro-Russian voices are successful at spreading narratives that are generally artificial to non-Russian audiences. Researchers found that slur-laden rhetoric is certainly present and reaches some international audiences. However, the uses of slurs on X tended to be overwhelmingly in the context of the war, rather than transforming into a more "pedestrian" anti-Ukrainianism outside that context (such as in content about Ukrainian refugees).

What Do Findings Say About the Impact of Russia's REMVE Narratives?

Overall, findings from these analyses suggest some successes for Russian REMVE narratives—if success is defined purely in terms of reach. Pro-Russian actors have managed to push their narratives maligning and dehumanizing Ukrainians to multilingual communities, in which these narratives might be expected to have little resonance. But there are also distinct limits to Russia’s ability to successfully mainstream its propaganda and mobilize international audiences against Ukrainians using hateful and dehumanizing rhetoric.

Although multilingual, REMVE conversations on these two platforms remain highly Russian-language dominated in key respects. Russian-language accounts and channels are the most active generators and spreaders of REMVE content. On both platforms, Russian-language actors and content are invariably the most virulent and most central to the spread of the most dehumanizing rhetoric.

Although they actively generate dehumanizing content, there were distinct limits to pro-Russian, Russian-language actors’ ability to shape discussions around this content. The anti-Ukrainian, Russian-language X accounts that posted the greatest volume of virulent content, and that most actively sought to engage others, did not draw much attention from others in the network and tended to have low numbers of followers. That is, despite the apparent intent of these account holders to shape discourse in the network, they largely failed to do so. To some extent, this was also the case for some of the most virulent channels on Telegram. The most virulent voices also tended to be concentrated in specific, Russian-language–dominated communities. Furthermore, at least on X, pro-Russian voices did not always have the most sway. Pro-Ukrainian and anti-Russian voices were well represented in some of these networks, and these voices often had higher numbers of followers and attention to their posts. These discourse communities on X were often not echo chambers, but contested information spaces between Russia and Ukraine.

Implications for Policymakers

The study’s findings suggest some implications for how U.S. policymakers might counter Russian REMVE narratives and reduce the threat that they catalyze violent extremism against Ukrainians and other targeted identities:

• Extensive and elaborate U.S. government-led campaigns to specifically target the actors producing REMVE narratives or the spread of narratives on social media platforms may be unnecessary. Active challenges to REMVE narratives are already being made on social media by pro-Ukrainian voices, whose successes are likely due to the organic nature of the response and the authenticity of the online voices.
• The U.S. government can increase the supply of fact-based information and counternarratives to support known and trusted voices operating within online communities.
• The U.S. government can also support efforts to investigate, reveal, and publicize state-affiliated actors and proxies, which can help reduce their credibility.
• The U.S. government and partners could selectively support organizations and individuals with credibility for audiences that appear particularly susceptible to Russia’s REMVE narratives, including audiences in Eastern Europe that tend to have strong pro-Russian sentiments, such as Serbian speakers and Bulgarian speakers.
• The best methods to forestall violence and hamper violent actors may be in the realm of law enforcement and investigations rather than information efforts.
• Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and Specifically Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) designations could continue to be useful tools, particularly for organizations in the countries where there is greater susceptibility to Russian REMVE propaganda.

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Topics

• European Union
• Russia
• Social Media Analysis
• Ukraine
• Violent Extremism