January 26 marked seven years since China released its first public Arctic policy (PDF)—a policy in which it famously described itself as a “Near-Arctic State.” At the time of its release, this white paper was perceived as a clear indication of China's desire to position itself in a region where major changes are happening as a result of a warming climate. Seven years on, China's scorecard in the Arctic is mixed, suggesting that while U.S. policymakers must continue to recognize the importance of China's actions and interests in Arctic policies and plans, they should do so with the right priority and focus.
China first expressed interest in the Arctic with its signing of Svalbard Treaty in 1925. China has long taken an interest in northern scientific research, including through the establishment in 2004 of its Yellow River Research Station in the Svalbard Archipelago in the high north of Norway. China also became Alaska's largest export market and invested in Russian natural gas in deals that pre-dated 2018. What was different about the 2018 policy was that it showed a more cohesive plan that formally positioned the region as part of the broader Belt and Road Initiative through the Polar Silk Road concept. It also laid out a sweeping set of fundamentals centered on “respect, cooperation, win-win result, and sustainability” intended to guide China's engagement in the region.
What impact has China's 2018 policy—and its subsequent implementation—had on the region and the security of the United States' northernmost borders, economy, and partnerships? Arguably, China's most significant accomplishment may have been to force a debate on the role that non-Arctic states that see themselves as Arctic stakeholders can and should play in regional governance. China, in this regard, is similar (although with larger ambitions and capabilities) to many other countries, from Singapore to Italy, that have an interest in—and sometimes a specific strategy for—the Arctic.
China is similar (although with larger ambitions and capabilities) to many other countries, from Singapore to Italy, that have an interest in—and sometimes a specific strategy for—the Arctic.
China has also made concrete progress in its involvement with Russia along economic, diplomatic, and military dimensions. Leveraging the Northern Sea Route along the coast of northern Russia, the Polar Silk Road concept has gained both form and limited practical use. Chinese companies are among the most frequent users of this route, primarily in bringing natural gas to Chinese markets, but also looking to widen opportunities for shipping more broadly.
In a somewhat unexpected twist between two countries that have historically been rivals, Russia has also been the conduit for more of a Chinese security and military presence in the Arctic. China and Russia signed a cooperation agreement between their Coast Guards in Murmansk in April 2023. There have been joint naval patrols near Alaska in 2022 and 2023, as well as Chinese and Russian bombers flying together within the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone in July 2024.
In 2024, Chinese naval vessels conducted what they described in communications to the U.S. Coast Guard as “freedom of navigation operations” in the Bering Sea. These were in accordance with international rules and norms, and the carefully chosen words in the communication and the route the ships took suggest this may have had less to do with the Arctic and more with responding to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in Southeast Asia. Still, this served to demonstrate China's willingness to approach the Arctic on its own, not always following in Russia's wake.
The United States is seeing this new Chinese activity facilitated by Russia as a major concern. The most recent U.S. Department of Defense Arctic Strategy published in July 2024 lists “PRC Activities in the Arctic” first when discussing the U.S. strategic environment in the region, followed by “Russian Activities in the Arctic” and, coming in third, “PRC-Russia Collaboration.” China is clearly seen as a potential threat in the region, though its ambitions are progressing slowly.
Although these new patterns of Chinese activity are significant, and may even represent an emboldened China, Chinese activities across the Arctic region as a whole—even after 2018—remain limited in geographic scope, duration, and intensity. While Chinese companies have attempted various ventures to exploit Arctic natural resources, invest in infrastructure, and purchase land, their success has been limited. In some cases, lack of profitability (or expected future gains) explains why efforts came to a halt, as with oil exploration in the Dreki area near Iceland or the iron ore Isua field in Greenland. In other cases, Arctic states pushed back on Chinese efforts to invest in the region, with examples ranging from a decision by Denmark to refurbish by itself three airports in Greenland in 2018 to, more critically for the Polar Silk Road project, the suspension of the project to build an Arctic corridor connecting the Arctic to continental Europe via Norway, Finland, and Estonia.
China's economic, scientific, and information activities in the Arctic, while not overwhelming in number, could present distinct security risks to Arctic countries and offer intelligence collection opportunities.
Yet while China's activities in the Arctic are limited, they do not present zero risk. New RAND research found China's economic, scientific, and information activities in the Arctic, while not overwhelming in number, could present distinct security risks to Arctic countries and offer intelligence collection opportunities. Yet they do not all warrant the same level of scrutiny. Knowledge development and public and science diplomacy present limited threats. Natural resource extraction mostly presents risks when undertaken on a large scale or combined with control of infrastructure or means of transportation. Chinese involvement in communications and, to a lesser extent, infrastructure and transportation are broad categories of activities with the most potential for military and intelligence threats.
China sees the Arctic not as a strategic priority, but rather as a long-term investment. While many of its Arctic ambitions remain unfulfilled at this point, it is slowly building up its capacities to operate in a region where few can do so and is using all tools of soft power—from economic investments to science diplomacy—to establish itself as a legitimate Arctic stakeholder. The United States needs more than ever its Arctic allies to closely monitor the vast and changing Arctic environment, push back on Chinese activities of concern, and maintain a regional governance system that China is hoping to change some day to its benefit.
