New Insights from the RAND National Security Research Division

September 13, 2024

by David A. Ochmanek, Anna Dowd, Stephen J. Flanagan, Andrew R. Hoehn, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Michael J. Lostumbo, and Michael J. Mazarr

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. defense strategy has been predicated on military forces that were superior in all domains to those of any adversary. But the security environment has deteriorated as adversaries have become more powerful, and that superiority has eroded or in some cases disappeared. In short, U.S. defense strategy and posture have become insolvent: The tasks we expect our military forces and other elements of national power to execute internationally now exceed the means available to accomplish those tasks. Current U.S. and allied forces lack key capabilities—including near-real-time sensing, survivable forward bases and prepositioned stocks, and standoff weapons—necessary to deter and defeat modern threats.

Reversing this erosion will not only require more and better weapon systems; it will also call for changing the posture of U.S. forces abroad and, above all, adopting innovative operational concepts.

Our recommendations for the United States and its Allies include:

• Develop ways to bring combat power to bear without lengthy mobilization and reinforcement and reduce the exposure of forward-based forces to precision attacks.
• Enable defending forces to observe and track enemy forces from the outset of hostilities.
• Deliver combat power against the enemy's invasion force immediately without risking the loss of excessive numbers of forces.

The United States does not necessarily need to increase its defense budget to achieve these ends. But it does need to allocate funds more strategically, and it needs to bring a sense of urgency to this challenge.

The United States and its allies and partners should:

1. deploy additional forces and support assets in the Western Pacific and in Europe, ensuring that they can be operated during wartime in ways that make them difficult for the enemy to locate, track, and attack;
2. develop and deploy new technologies to create robust sensing and targeting grids in contested battlespaces; and
3. acquire much larger quantities of specialized weapons and munitions, especially those that engage moving forces—ships, armored columns, and aircraft—because they can enable effective attacks on the invasion force without requiring that the enemy's air defenses be suppressed or dismantled.

DoD must first of all devise and formalize a new approach to warfighting that negates the challenges posed by the forces of modern adversaries, namely, large inventories of long-range missiles, sophisticated air defenses, advanced reconnaissance sensors, counter-space weapons, and cyber and electronic attack systems. Simultaneously, DoD can increase investments in affordable systems that fill key capability gaps and can be fielded in two to five years. Standoff precision-guided munitions, systems for sensing and targeting that exploit mass and mobility, and forward postures that feature greater resiliency and expanded prepositioning merit emphasis.

Taiwan: The goal should be a more tactically proficient Taiwan force that can share information and targeting data, even during high-intensity combat.

Japan: U.S. and Japanese planners should focus on better defending bases against ballistic and cruise missiles, stockpiling munitions for a prolonged conflict, creating a joint plan for military operations in the event of an attack on Taiwan, and training to improve wartime interoperability.

NATO: Now is the time to further build a robust deterrent posture on the Alliance's eastern flank, develop a five-year plan to enlarge munitions inventories, apply lessons that the Ukraine army is learning, and give assurances to Ukraine for support.

• Preparing to defend U.S territory and critical infrastructure
• Articulating priority operational challenges and accelerating force adaptation
• Incentivizing innovation, bringing good ideas from across the Services to the forefront
• Working with allies to develop the required operational concepts and capabilities
• Making Congress a partner, ensuring that it understands the urgent need for change

This summary is derived from Inflection Point: How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence (RR-A2555-1) by David A. Ochmanek, Anna Dowd, Stephen J. Flanagan, Andrew R. Hoehn, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Michael J. Lostumbo, and Michael J. Mazarr.

For more information about this study, reply to this message and we'll connect you to the authors.

Want to stop receiving these messages? Reply to this message with "Unsubscribe" in the subject line.