The rapid collapse of the 50-year rule of the Assad family December 7 ended a brutal regime in Syria, but also precipitated bombings and attacks by Israel, the United States, and Turkey, where each is worried about what might happen in a power vacuum. Abandoning Assad's regime will also have ramifications for Iran and Russia.
We invited a group of RAND experts to discuss the rebel group that led the overthrow, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, as well as the regional and global implications.
Russia, through air strikes, and Iran, through Hezbollah's ground forces, had helped keep Assad in power for years. Why did they abandon the regime this time? Was it simply that they were stretched thin by other conflicts?
Raphael Cohen Both Moscow and Tehran would have preferred Assad to remain in power. Assad's downfall puts the future of Russia's military bases there in play and HTS has explicitly stated that it wants Syria to stop being a “playground for Iranian ambitions.” As to why they didn't get involved, a lot of it comes down to both Russia and Iran being tied down by the war in Ukraine and war in the broader Middle East.
Karen Sudkamp An additional calculation could be that protecting the Assad regime was no longer worth the investment. In addition to supporting proxy militias, Iranian forces spent years training the Syrian army. During HTS's advance from Idlib Province, the army often did not exhibit a will to fight against HTS forces or to protect the Assad regime. Russia and Iran likely considered the effort and capabilities of the Assad regime and its inability to protect itself and made a strategic calculation.
Ann Marie Dailey It's a sign of how much Russia's military has been degraded. It's possible that if Iran had decided to send forces, Russia might have provided further assistance. But Iran is under pressure from Israeli operations against Hamas, Hezbollah, in Syria, and against Iran itself. Tehran was not in a position to help, and that made it untenable for Russia.
The overthrow of an ally in Syria is just the latest geopolitical setback for neighboring Iran. How might this affect power dynamics in Tehran?
Michelle Grisé The fall of the Assad regime has likely heightened Tehran's fears: If the Syrian government could collapse, might the Iranian regime be next? The erosion of Iran's proxy network is also coming on the heels of Israeli strikes that caused significant damage to Iranian air defenses and ballistic missile production sites in October. This could lead Tehran to double down on its nuclear capability. Alternatively, however, it could incentivize renewed Iranian outreach to the West. Russia's failure to prevent the fall of the Assad regime may increase Tehran's doubts about the reliability of Russia as a partner and provide an opening for President Masoud Pezeshkian's administration to advocate for reengagement with the West.
Russia's failure to prevent the fall of the Assad regime may increase Tehran's doubts about the reliability of Russia as a partner.
The future of Russia's Tartus naval base and the Hmeimim air base, both critical platforms for Russian power projection in the region, is unclear. How else is the collapse of the Assad regime likely to affect Russia?
William Courtney For over a half-century, Syria has been Moscow's closest ally in the Middle East. Russian combat jets have relentlessly bombed anti-Assad rebels for a decade, including Syria's new rulers, who may not be inclined to renew Russian access to Tartus and a nearby air base.
The swift fall of Assad's regime is likely to embarrass Putin and his ex-KGB cohort at home. Russian hardliners have been critical of Putin for the long-stalemated and costly war in Ukraine. They and other Russian elites may now also blame him for “losing Syria.” Putin's leadership is coming under greater stress and rivals might reassess their chances of challenging him.
Finally, Putin's Russia will likely be seen abroad as less invincible than some thought it to be. This may encourage some regional or global opponents. Ukraine and its Western partners could view Russia as weaker. This may encourage them to sustain and bolster support for Ukraine's resistance to Russian aggression.
Grisé Whereas Russia has grown accustomed to relying on force to advance its interests in Syria, it will now need to engage in diplomacy to preserve a foothold in the country.
The events of the last week also call into question Russia's future trajectory within a deepening anti-Western axis alongside China, Iran, and North Korea. Having lost one key ally in the Middle East, Russia may decide to double down on its growing partnership with Iran. But Russia's failure to prevent the collapse of the Syrian regime has exposed the limits of its power and the costs of the war in Ukraine, which could seed doubts in Tehran and Pyongyang about the value of continuing to invest in closer ties with Moscow.
Dailey Militarily, it removes what arguably are Russia's most strategically important foreign air and naval facilities. Hmeimim and Tartus enabled Russian operations throughout the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Africa. Economically, this access has been a key enabler of Russian sanctions evasion schemes. Moscow will be left scrambling for alternate facilities, possibly in Africa. Though unlikely to destabilize Moscow, the follow-on effects of this strategic loss could lead to further shake-ups in the Russian military and in the Kremlin.
Some suggest that Turkey may step in now as a regional stabilizer. Does that seem likely? What does Turkey gain?
Dailey For the past two decades, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has sought to position himself as a leader of the Muslim world and Turkey as a regional power player. He will seek to leverage this situation to bolster Turkey's influence in the region, decrease Iranian influence, and possibly use the situation as leverage in negotiations with Russia on other areas of mutual interest. More immediately, Turkey will seek to divest itself from the large numbers of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey and undermine the role and influence of the People's Defense Units (YPG) and other Kurdish groups in Syria that it sees as being tied to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
Courtney The Kremlin may worry that Turkey's clout in Syria will grow at Russia's expense. Turkey has helped sponsor the victorious rebels. Turkey remains a valuable member of NATO and it hosts a major U.S. air base.
What are some of Israel's concerns and how might it try to influence what happens next?
Cohen For Israel, the question really is between the devil you know versus the devil you don't. Israel viewed Assad's Syria as essentially a puppet of its archenemy Iran. Indeed, Iran had been propping up the Assad regime with weapons and advisors. Consequently, Israel is very happy to see Assad gone. The question, though, is what comes next? While Ahmad al-Sharaa, the present leader of HTS, struck a moderate tone vis-à-vis Israel in his most recent remarks, the Israeli news media is showing videos of rebels promising to march on Jerusalem. It's also important to remember that HTS grew out of al Qaeda—again, no friend of Israel.
As for how Israel will try to shape what happens next, I think you will see two tracks. The most visible one is the military side: airstrikes to destroy Assad's chemical weapons stockpiles and other high-value weaponry. Israel has also moved to control Mt. Hermon on the Golan Heights that overlooks Israel in an effort to establish a buffer zone. My guess is that this will be accompanied by quieter backroom diplomacy as Israel tries to see what direction the new Syrian government will take.
Israel has also reportedly targeted suspected stockpiles of chemical weapons, which Assad infamously used on Syrian citizens during the civil war. What do we know about the state of chemical weapons in Syria today? What could happen to this arsenal now?
John Parachini Just last month the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) stated that the Syrian Arab Republic had not satisfactorily declared where it developed, produced, or stockpiled various chemical weapons, including chlorine or sarin nerve agent. Two possible locations of any stockpiles are the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC). The Syrian Arab Air Force also dropped chlorine cylinders on residential buildings, according to OPCW. Syria's special forces, known as the Tiger Forces, were involved in this attack. Thus, Israeli targets probably include SSRC facilities, where Tiger Forces may be located, and Syrian air force bases. Chlorine is an industrial chemical that is likely stored in many places around the country and Israelis might attack industrial facilities as well. The downside of Israeli airstrikes on any of these suspect sites is that it may destroy the evidence of Syria's clandestine chemical program, which they—and the Russians—denied existed for years.
Shortly after seizing Damascus, HTS issued a statement seeking international assistance to secure any residual chemical weapons the Assad regime still had in the country. This is a stunning development: a non-state actor, indeed a group on the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations, coming forward and eschewing a desire to acquire chemical weapons for its own purposes, calling for international help, and condemning their use by the Assad regime. A high priority for the international community should be enabling OPCW experts to answer this call and assess, secure, and destroy any chemical weapons left in the Assad regime's arsenal.
HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (aka Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani) said he and his organization have given up extremism, but he and the group are still designated by the United States as terrorists. What does this mean for the United States engaging with a potential new government in Syria?
Cohen This is not the only time in history that terrorist groups assumed control of a state and became the government. In some cases, the United States has recognized these governments and their leaders; other times it hasn't. President-elect Trump also has demonstrated an unconventional approach to diplomacy including engaging with U.S. adversaries (e.g., the DPRK or Taliban outreach during the first administration). It's not inconceivable that he'd take an unconventional approach here. A lot, I think, will depend on how HTS behaves now that it is in power.
Sudkamp Being designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) primarily limits “material support or resources” to a designated group. So if HTS is the primary leader of a transition or new Syrian government, that could impact U.S. diplomatic engagement or provision of foreign aid. The United Kingdom publicly noted on December 9 that it would consider reviewing its terrorist designation of HTS, based on the group's actions in the coming months. There is precedent for the United States removing an FTO designation from a group, but a review will likely depend on HTS behavior in the coming months.
The United States carried out airstrikes against ISIS targets Sunday. Is there any concern that the rebels who have toppled Assad might join forces with ISIS?
Sudkamp It is unlikely that HTS will welcome ISIS into the governing coalition. While HTS has historical founding roots with both ISIS and al Qaeda, the split from ISIS in the early 2010s was acrimonious. HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa's primary focus for fighting has been freeing Syria from Assad's regime, with the goal of an Islamist government, albeit theoretically less extreme than ISIS's so-called caliphate. Only time will tell if HTS and the new Syrian government target ISIS themselves, or continue to allow the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to fight ISIS with U.S. military support.
Another key issue related to ISIS is the presumed fighters who remain in prisons under SDF control and the family members who remain in refugee camps in northeastern Syria. Despite attempts to repatriate family members (predominately women and children) to their home nations, around 45,000 individuals remain in the camps, which also include internally displaced Syrians. These individuals remain at risk for radicalization and recruitment; ISIS has attempted multiple prison breaks to free the fighters. Many of these individuals have been in a legal limbo for the past five years, which is unlikely to be cleared up any time soon.
Some Syrians remained loyal to Assad for years because the regime was seen as a bulwark against Islamists. Are HTS hardline Islamists? Is there any reason to think a pluralistic or more democratic Syria will emerge here?
Cohen That's the million-dollar question here. Ahmed al-Sharaa started his career as an ISIS affiliate before deliberately rebranding himself into a more moderate image. It was notable that when al-Sharaa gave his victory speech in Damascus, he talked about a more inclusive future. He also dressed differently: no turban or khafifyah—common among jihadist leaders—but rather that drab green outfit similar to what Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Ukrainian leaders wear. That said, we know from history that groups behave very differently once they are in power than when they are trying to gain it (e.g., the Taliban made all sorts of promises during negotiations that are not reflected in how they are running Afghanistan). And so, we'll see.
Sudkamp HST and al-Sharaa have sought to publicly distance themselves from both ISIS and al Qaeda and present a more tolerant Islamist government ideal. During their rule of Idlib Province, however, HTS has focused on maintaining control over developing pluralistic or democratic structures that Western governments would recognize. Al-Sharaa likely recognizes the importance of emphasizing moderation and recognizing the ethnic and religious diversity of Syria at this moment. However, it is likely in the mid- to longer term they will push for a society and government that reflects their current governance style.
What are other implications for U.S. interests in the region?
Sudkamp The region remains at a global economic and strategic crossroads. However, the political, social, and security environments have evolved greatly since 9/11, the 2011 Arab Spring, and even Hamas's attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. This is a key moment for U.S. policymakers to consider what the nation's goals and objectives are for the region, beyond what usually occurs at the change of presidential administrations.
This is a key moment for U.S. policymakers to consider what the nation's goals and objectives are for the region, beyond what usually occurs at the change of presidential administrations.
CourtneyThere will be many ripple effects. Russia will likely be less able to challenge to U.S. interests in the Middle East, as it did in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Russia's naval presence in the sensitive eastern Mediterranean region is likely to decline.
Cohen The Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations have all in different forms wanted to wash their hands of the Middle East, and each time around, the regional dynamics keep sucking the United States back in. The sudden downfall of the Assad regime is just the latest example of how precarious the region's political and security dynamics are. Future U.S. defense strategy should reflect this reality.
Dailey Since the initial Syrian uprising in 2011, Turkey has bemoaned that NATO seemed not to appreciate the threat of terrorism against Turkey. Furthermore, U.S. support for the Kurdish YPG has strained U.S.-Turkey relations. The current risky state of affairs in Syria is fraught with both danger and opportunity—danger that Syria could become a terrorist haven on the Mediterranean and NATO's doorstep, and opportunity to improve U.S. and NATO relations with Turkey, engage with Iran from a position of relative strength, and reassess U.S. military forces and missions in the Middle East. The United States should work with Turkey and through NATO to develop a more sustainable, long-term approach to the Middle East, not just one that is based on countering specific threats in specific places without consideration to broader geopolitical concerns.
