For decades, China and Pakistan have maintained an “all-weather” strategic partnership designed to endure any hardship. This relationship was borne out of a mutual desire to counter India within South Asia and, more recently, to help Beijing manage the challenge of rising Islamic extremism and to offer Islamabad an alternative economic and defense partner in the face of its rockier ties with the United States.
But Beijing and Islamabad have lately been at loggerheads over two key issues that threaten bilateral harmony.
First is the lack of security for Chinese citizens who are working on Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure projects in Pakistan, particularly in the restive southwestern province of Balochistan. Chinese engineers and other personnel are in the country to build and maintain infrastructure for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the BRI's flagship project that is worth around $50 billion.
In response to the numerous lethal attacks on Chinese engineers and other personnel in Pakistan, Islamabad's deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Ishaq Dar, strongly insinuated that Beijing could tolerate the situation. Dar claimed that Chinese President Xi Jinping told Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, “Your country is the only exception” to China placing the security of its personnel above profit.
Beijing and Islamabad have lately been at loggerheads over two key issues that threaten bilateral harmony.
Dar's comment apparently struck a raw nerve with the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Jiang Zaidong, who quite uncharacteristically broke with diplomatic niceties and replied: “It is unacceptable for us to be attacked twice in only six months. President Xi cares about Chinese people's security and puts people's lives first.” He further noted that “Pakistan should severely punish the perpetrators and crack down on all anti-China terrorist groups” and that the lack of security was the biggest constraint on CPEC cooperation.
It appears that Beijing has already been holding out on some additional investments as a result of Islamabad's security lapses. The ML-1 railway project connecting Karachi in the south to Peshawar in the north, for example, has been delayed for months. However, China and Pakistan are also trying to finalize a deal that would allow Chinese security personnel to enter the country to provide protection, and would include the use of armored vehicles to protect Chinese citizens from terrorist attacks.
Another sore point for Beijing and Islamabad is the future of Pakistan's Gwadar Port. For years, China has helped develop the port into a commercial hub. Yet there has always been speculation that Beijing might one day deploy military forces to Gwadar as part of its “string of pearls” strategy to hem in India along the Indian Ocean.
According to one recent report, bilateral negotiations broke down last year when Islamabad, in response to Beijing's request to establish a military presence at Gwadar, demanded that China share second-strike nuclear capabilities with Pakistan to help it better deter India's nuclear upgrades.
Beijing was reportedly incensed and outright rejected the demand because it would certainly be revealed and open China up to potential sanctions under its obligations as a nuclear member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. China was likewise angered by Pakistan's decision to deny the Chinese navy from making a port call at Gwadar during a joint naval Sea Guardians III exercise, allegedly due to American pressure.
The China-Pakistan strategic partnership more broadly appears to be under some unusual duress. According to the same recent report, internal Pakistani documents from 2023 show officials describing the relationship as having experienced a “gradual erosion” in the last year, which had resulted in “particularly cold” ties. Notably, this assessment took place prior to the latest disagreement over Gwadar and spate of terrorist attacks on Chinese citizens in the country, suggesting that the relationship may be even worse today.
But not all is bad in China-Pakistan relations, and indeed, the strategic partnership is more likely than not to continue to muddle along. Islamabad, for example, is poised to become the first foreign purchaser of China's stealth J-35 multi-role jet fighters. Other areas of economic and defense cooperation remain robust as well.
Nevertheless, if the downturn is sustained, then it could hold significant geopolitical consequences. Pakistan could eventually determine that it must prioritize its strategic partnership with the United States over China. To be sure, Washington has been Pakistan's preferred partner for some time, but Islamabad has not correspondingly downgraded its Chinese ties to appease the United States. Now, it may, though that could also be complicated by the incoming Trump administration. During his first administration as U.S. president, for instance, Donald Trump suspended most security assistance to Islamabad.
Worsening China-Pakistan relations might prompt Islamabad to strive for better India ties, given that Pakistan would have less support from China to deter New Delhi.
Worsening China-Pakistan relations might also prompt Islamabad to strive for better India ties, given that Pakistan would have less support from China to deter New Delhi. This would still be tempered, however, by longstanding and deep disagreements between Pakistan and India over the sovereignty status of Kashmir.
Alternatively, Pakistan could increasingly turn to Russia to compensate for a lack of Chinese support. Former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, who still has a high level of popular support in the country, visited Moscow in February 2022 to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Khan sought to lay the groundwork for a stronger bilateral partnership, and since the start of Russia's war against Ukraine, Islamabad has remained neutral, suggesting that it has tried to preserve ties.
In the future, it is worth continuing to observe the status of China-Pakistan relations. The geostrategic implications of a sustained downturn could be seismic. But such a souring is also likely to be quiet and incremental, as demonstrated over the last couple of years, and thus will require close attention and analysis.
